La reclamante alega la violaci\u00f3n del art\u00edculo 8 del Convenio de Roma, que dice que \u201ctoda persona tiene derecho al respeto de su vida privada y familiar, de su domicilio y de su correspondencia\u201d. Para que dicha reclamaci\u00f3n prospere, se deber\u00e1 demostrar, como reiteradamente viene exigiendo el Tribunal en su jurisprudencia, que el perjuicio causado alcanza un nivel m\u00ednimo de gravedad, lo que depender\u00e1 de las circunstancias concretas de cada caso, siendo para ello relevantes, entre otros datos, la intensidad y la duraci\u00f3n del perjuicio, as\u00ed como los efectos f\u00edsicos y mentales. En este caso, el Tribunal considera que el nivel de ruido y sus efectos no han sido nunca evaluados. As\u00ed pues, resulta imposible determinar hasta qu\u00e9 punto la enfermedad que padecen ha sido causada o agravada por el tr\u00e1fico de la carretera. Sin embargo, considera que los efectos acumulativos del ruido, vibraci\u00f3n y contaminaci\u00f3n del suelo y aire han perturbado negativamente la vida familiar\u00a0 de la demandante.<\/p>\r\n
La Corte apunta adem\u00e1s que la gesti\u00f3n de las infraestructuras es una tarea complicada que exige un coste econ\u00f3mico importante. Aunque los Estados han asumido una mayor responsabilidad a la hora de controlar la contaminaci\u00f3n, no puede exigirse a cada Estado que asegure a cada individuo el disfrute de su vivienda de acuerdo con las normas ambientales particulares. Ahora bien, consideran que no se ha establecido un justo equilibrio entre los intereses de los demandantes y los intereses de la comunidad en su conjunto, porque no se han respetado determinas exigencias de naturaleza procedimental: no se ha llevado a cabo un estudio adecuado sobre la viabilidad ambiental del proyecto; no se ha permitido a los afectados contestar judicialmente a la actuaci\u00f3n estatal; pero, sobre todo, se ha negado la participaci\u00f3n del demandante en el correspondiente proceso de toma de decisiones medioambientales. Consecuentemente se ha producido una violaci\u00f3n del art\u00edculo 8 del Convenio.<\/p>\r\n
Destacamos los siguientes extractos:<\/strong><\/p>\r\n
58.\u00a0\u00a0Referring to its well-established case-law (see, among other authorities, L\u00f3pez Ostra v. Spain<\/em>, 9 December 1994, Series A no. 303-C; Dubetska and Others v. Ukraine<\/em>, no. 30499\/03, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0105-108, 10 February 2011) the Court reiterates that, where, as in the present case, the case concerns an environmental hazard, an arguable claim under Article 8 may arise only where the hazard at issue attains a level of severity resulting in significant impairment of the applicant\u2019s ability to enjoy her home, private or family life. The assessment of that minimum level is relative and depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the intensity and duration of the nuisance and its physical or mental effects on the individual\u2019s health or quality of life.<\/p>\r\n
59.\u00a0\u00a0In line with these principles, the Court must first consider whether the detriment suffered by the applicant on account of the operation of the M04 motorway starting from October 1998 was sufficiently serious to raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention. The Court observes that the applicant\u2019s complaints concern, primarily, the level of noise, damage to her house from vibration and her sufferings on account of the deterioration of her parents\u2019 and her minor son\u2019s health resulting from air and soil pollution.<\/p>\r\n
60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that there is insufficient evidence to prove all the applicant\u2019s allegations \u2018beyond reasonable doubt\u2019. In particular, the noise levels and their impact on the applicant\u2019s private and family life have never been measured (see a contrario<\/em> De\u00e9s v. Hungary<\/em>, no. 2345\/06, \u00a7 23, 9\u00a0November 2010). The allegation that the damage to the house had been caused by vibration was disputed by the Government with reference to a competent authority\u2019s opinion and has never been confirmed by an independent expert. Insofar as the applicant\u2019s parents\u2019 health can fall within the scope of her family life under Article 8, the case file contains medical evidence that they suffer from numerous illnesses. However, based on this evidence, it is not possible to determine to what extent these illnesses have been caused or aggravated by the operation of the motorway. As regards the health of the applicant\u2019s minor son, it appears that he already suffered from immunodeficiency before October 1998 and that in his doctors\u2019 opinion he had resided in an \u2018environmentally saturated area\u2019 from his birth in 1994 (see paragraph 17 above).<\/p>\r\n
61.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, the Court notes that according to the official investigation of 15 May 2002 (see paragraph 12 above), the surface of the road near the applicant\u2019s house was severely damaged and more than one hundred vehicles drove over it during one hour. It is not implausible in these circumstances that the applicant was regularly disturbed by noise and vibration, at least to some extent. Further, more than half of the examined vehicles were found to be emitting pollutants in excess of applicable safety standards. The level of air and soil pollution was assessed by the domestic environmental health authorities as necessitating the suspension of the use of the road, on pain of risk of adverse impact on the residents\u2019 health (see paragraph 19 above). The polluting substances emitted by the vehicles included copper and lead, an excessive level of which was also found in the soil near the applicant\u2019s house. In light of these findings, the Court considers it particularly notable that the applicant\u2019s son was diagnosed in 2002 with chronic lead and copper salts poisoning. The Court notes that the Government have not provided any evidence disproving the authenticity and accuracy of this diagnosis and have not proposed any plausible alternative explanation concerning the origin of this poisoning to counter the applicant\u2019s allegation that it was directly connected to the motorway\u2019s operation.<\/p>\r\n
62.\u00a0\u00a0Regard being had to the above data, the Court considers that the cumulative effect of noise, vibration and air and soil pollution generated by the M04 motorway significantly deterred the applicant from enjoying her rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. Article\u00a08 is therefore applicable in the present case.<\/p>\r\n
63.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court will next examine, in the light of the principles developed in its jurisprudence (see, among other authorities, Dubetska<\/em>, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 140-145) whether the Government have provided sufficient evidence to justify a situation in which the applicant bore a heavy burden on behalf of the rest of the community.<\/p>\r\n
64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court firstly notes that, as submitted by the Government, on 16\u00a0June 2002, within one month of the investigation by the environmental health authorities, K. Street was closed off to through traffic. Lacking concrete data, and, in particular, texts of relevant domestic decisions (if any) in evidence of the applicant\u2019s allegations that this decision was in fact enforced at an unspecified later date or that the traffic was eventually restarted, the Court will proceed from the assumption that through traffic was stopped on the date suggested by the Government (see, mutatis mutandis<\/em>, Vinokurov v. Russia and Ukraine<\/em> (dec.), no. 2937\/04, 16 October 2007). Consequently, it must be noted that the issues of noise, vibration, air and soil pollution connected to its functioning were redressed. It, however, remains to be examined whether the State authorities should still be liable for the adverse effects of the motorway\u2019s operation between October 1998 and June 2002.<\/p>\r\n
65.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing this matter, the Court recognises the complexity of the State\u2019s tasks in handling infrastructural issues, such as the present one, where measures requiring considerable time and resources may be necessary. Being mindful of its subsidiary role under the Convention, on many occasions the Court has emphasized that the States should enjoy a considerable margin of appreciation in the complex sphere of environmental policymaking (see, for example, Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom <\/em>[GC], <\/em>no. 36022\/97, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2003-VIII). While the authorities of the Member States are increasingly taking on responsibility for minimising or controlling pollution, Article 8 cannot be construed as requiring them to ensure that every individual enjoys housing that meets particular environmental standards (see Ward v. the United Kingdom<\/em> (dec.), no.\u00a031888\/03, 9 November 2004). In line with these considerations, the Court considers that it would be going too far to render the Government responsible for the very fact of allowing cross-town through traffic to pass through a populated street or establish the applicant\u2019s general right to free, new housing at the State\u2019s expense. All the more so, given that the applicant in the present case has not argued that her house has decreased in value since October 1998 or that she has otherwise been unable to sell it and relocate without the State\u2019s support (see, a contrario<\/em>, Fadeyeva v. Russia<\/em>, no. 55723\/00, \u00a7 121, ECHR 2005-IV).<\/p>\r\n
66.\u00a0\u00a0While the Court finds no reason to reassess the substance of the Government\u2019s decision to allow the use of K. Street as a through road, in examining the procedural aspect of relevant policymaking, the Court is not convinced that minimal safeguards to ensure a fair balance between the applicant\u2019s and the community\u2019s interests were put in place.<\/p>\r\n
67.\u00a0\u00a0It notes, firstly, that the Government have not shown that the 1998 decision to route motorway M04 via K. Street was preceded by an adequate feasibility study, assessing the probability of compliance with applicable environmental standards and enabling interested parties, including K. Street\u2019s residents, to contribute their views (see, a contrario<\/em>, Hatton<\/em>, cited above, \u00a7 128). On the contrary, the nature of this decision and the adequacy of attenuating procedures appear quite ambiguous, particularly in light of the Government\u2019s disagreement with the applicant as to whether the 1998 decision re-routed the traffic from P. Street to K. Street or merely confirmed K. Street\u2019s earlier status as a through road. The Court considers, however, that even if K. Street had been used by through traffic before the 1998 stocktaking project, the State authorities were responsible for ensuring minimal procedural safeguards in this project\u2019s course. Neither the domestic court decisions, nor the Government\u2019s observations contain evidence that these safeguards, and particularly public access to relevant environmental information and decision-taking in the period of contemplating the stocktaking project, existed.<\/p>\r\n
68.\u00a0\u00a0Secondly, the Court considers that no later than the time of the 1998 stocktaking project, the authorities likewise became responsible for putting in place a reasonable policy for mitigating the motorway\u2019s harmful effects on the Article 8 rights of K. Street\u2019s residents (see, mutatis mutandis<\/em>, Fadeyeva, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 127-131). It appears that the municipal authorities did take some measures aimed at the street\u2019s environmental management (see paragraph 30 above). However, neither the assessment made by domestic courts in their judgments, nor the Government\u2019s observations contain sufficient detail enabling the Court to conclude that this management was effective and meaningful before the measurement of critical pollution levels on 15 May 2002. As transpires from the available materials, this measurement session was carried out only in response to repeated complaints by K. Street\u2019s residents, which, according to the case file, were initially lodged no later than in 2000.<\/p>\r\n
69.\u00a0\u00a0Thirdly, emphasising the importance of public participation in environmental decision-making as a procedural safeguard for ensuring rights protected by Article 8 of the Convention, the Court underlines that an essential element of this safeguard is an individual\u2019s ability to challenge an official act or omission affecting her rights in this sphere before an independent authority (see Dubetska<\/em>, cited above, \u00a7 143). It also notes that as of 30 October 2001 the Aarhus Convention, which concerns access to information, participation of the public in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters has entered into force in respect of Ukraine (see paragraph 39 above). In the meantime, it has not been shown in the present case that the applicant was afforded a meaningful opportunity to contest the State authorities\u2019 policymaking regarding the M04 motorway during the period of October 1998 \u2013 June 2002 before the domestic courts.<\/p>\r\n
70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant formally attempted to do so by lodging through Mrs Grishchenko a civil claim against the Executive Committee. As appears from the brief reasoning adduced by the Lugansk Regional Court of Appeal for dismissing her claim (see paragraph 33 above), its analysis was mostly limited to concluding that the defendant was not at all responsible for K. Street\u2019s maintenance and repair. The Court notes that a variety of documents in the case file appear to pinpoint that such responsibility did \u2013 at least to some extent \u2013 in fact exist (see paragraphs\u00a024-26, 30 and 34 above), while the court\u2019s reasoning does not contain any reference to the evidence which served as a basis for its contrary conclusion.<\/p>\r\n
71.\u00a0\u00a0Regardless, however, of which authority was responsible for the maintenance of K. Street\u2019s road surface and other amenities, the Court finds it more important that the courts\u2019 reasoning does not contain a direct response to the applicant\u2019s main arguments, on the basis of which she had sought to establish the Executive Committee\u2019s liability. In particular, while the first-instance court questioned some witnesses as to some points of the municipality\u2019s environmental policy, neither its, nor the higher courts\u2019 judgments contain any express assessment as to why they considered that this policy adequately protected the applicant\u2019s rights. Likewise, no reasoning was provided for dismissing an allegation that the defendant\u2019s decision taken in October 1998 was in and of itself unlawful and arbitrary, and it is unclear from the case file whether this aspect of the applicant\u2019s complaint was at all studied during the proceedings at issue. The Court considers that the applicant\u2019s arguments concerning the unlawfulness and arbitrariness of the above decision and the adequacy of the municipality\u2019s environmental policy concerning K. Street were of paramount importance for resolving whether or not the defendant\u2019s conduct struck a fair balance between the applicant\u2019s rights guaranteed by Article 8 and the interests of the community. Lacking reasoning for the dismissal of these arguments in the texts of the domestic judgments, the Court is unable to conclude that the applicant had a meaningful opportunity to adduce her viewpoints before an independent authority.<\/p>\r\n
72.\u00a0\u00a0Overall, the Court\u00a0attaches importance to the following factors. First, the Government\u2019s failure to show that the decision to designate K. Street as part of the M04 motorway was preceded by an adequate environmental feasibility study and followed by the enactment of a reasonable environmental management policy. Second, the Government did not show that the applicant had a meaningful opportunity to contribute to the related decision-making processes, including by challenging the municipal policies before an independent authority. Bearing those two factors and the Aarhus Convention (see paragraph 39) in mind, the Court cannot conclude that a fair balance was struck in the present case.<\/p>\r\n
Comentario del autor:<\/strong><\/p>\r\n
Antes de nada hay que recordar que el Tribunal ha afirmado que, aunque el Convenio no reconoce expresamente el derecho a un ambiente sano (STEDH, as. Kyrtatos c. Grecia<\/em>, de 22 de mayo de 2003), la contaminaci\u00f3n de todo tipo, si alcanza un umbral m\u00ednimo de severidad, puede dar lugar a la violaci\u00f3n del Convenio. Ello se debe, seg\u00fan reiterada jurisprudencia, a que la vulneraci\u00f3n del derecho de respeto al domicilio enunciado en el art\u00edculo 8 del Convenio puede derivar no s\u00f3lo de injerencias de \u00edndole material o corporal, sino tambi\u00e9n de las agresiones inmateriales o incorp\u00f3reas, como ruidos, emisiones u olores (STEDH, as. Moreno G\u00f3mez c. Espa\u00f1a<\/em>, de 16 de noviembre de 2004). Ahora bien, hay que dejar al margen los peligros posibles o hipot\u00e9ticos, por lo que es preciso presentar una evaluaci\u00f3n de los da\u00f1os amparada en datos cient\u00edficos.<\/p>\r\n
En cualquier caso, las autoridades estatales pueden ser consideradas responsables no s\u00f3lo por una injerencia de los poderes p\u00fablicos, sino tambi\u00e9n por sus omisiones (obligaciones positivas), entre otras, la no adopci\u00f3n de medidas tendentes a asegurar el respeto de la vida privada. En este asunto vemos que lo que no se ha respetado son una serie de obligaciones de naturaleza procedimental, muy arraigas en el Derecho comunitario y en el Derecho internacional, como son el derecho de acceso al p\u00fablico a la informaci\u00f3n ambiental, el derecho de participaci\u00f3n del p\u00fablico en el proceso de toma de decisiones y el derecho de acceso a la justicia, todas ellas desarrolladas en el Convenio de Aarhus de 1998: un instrumento jur\u00eddico internacional que, como en otras ocasiones (STEDH, as. <\/em>Taskin y otros c. Turqu\u00eda<\/em>, de 4 de diciembre de 2003), ha servido, con independencia de su ratificaci\u00f3n por parte del Estado demandado, para interpretar las disposiciones del Convenio.<\/p>\r\n
\u00a0<\/p>","post_title":"Jurisprudencia al d\u00eda. Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Contaminaci\u00f3n ac\u00fastica","post_excerpt":"","post_status":"publish","comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","post_password":"","post_name":"jurisprudencia-al-dia-tribunal-europeo-de-derechos-humanos-contaminacion-acustica","to_ping":"","pinged":"","post_modified":"2012-02-09 21:32:13","post_modified_gmt":"2012-02-09 19:32:13","post_content_filtered":"","post_parent":0,"guid":"https:\/\/www.actualidadjuridicaambiental.com\/?p=6873","menu_order":0,"post_type":"post","post_mime_type":"","comment_count":"0","filter":"raw","post_title_ml":"Jurisprudencia al d\u00eda. Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Contaminaci\u00f3n ac\u00fasticaJurisprudencia al d\u00eda. Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Contaminaci\u00f3n ac\u00fasticaJurisprudencia al d\u00eda. Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Contaminaci\u00f3n ac\u00fastica","post_title_langs":{"es":true,"en":true,"fr":true}};-->
Sentencia del TEDH de 21 de julio de 2011, núm. 38182/03, Grimkovskaya c. Ucrania
Autor: Enrique J. Martínez Pérez, profesor contratado doctor de la Universidad de Valladolid
Palabras clave: contaminación acústica, participación pública, derecho al respeto a la vida privada y familiar
Resumen:
La sentencia que ahora exponemos resuelve una demanda presentada contra Ucrania por la contaminación derivada del intenso tráfico de una carretera. En 1998 las autoridades ucranianas modificaron el trazado de la autopista M04, desviándolo por una calle ubicada en una zona residencial en la ciudad de Krasnodon, donde vivía la demandante (Natalya Grimkovskaya) con sus padres y su hijo menor. Desde entonces su casa se convirtió prácticamente inhabitable; sufrieron vibraciones, polución y ruido constantes por la circulación de vehículos. Además, los numerosos baches que aparecieron posteriormente, originados por las malas condiciones del pavimento, fueros asfaltados con materiales muy baratos, tales como residuos de una mina de carbón cercana con un alto contenido en metales pesados. Ante las quejas de los vecinos, las autoridades sanitarias midieron los niveles de contaminación en la zona, llegando a la conclusión de que el contenido en polvo de cobre y plomo era respectivamente 23
Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de 15 de julio de 2011 (Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo, Sección 5ª, Ponente: Rafael Fernández Valverde)
Autora: Aitana de la Varga Pastor, Profesora Ayudante de Derecho Administrativo de la Universitat Rovira i Virgili e investigadora del Centre d’Estudis de Dret Ambiental de Tarragona (CEDAT)
Esta Sentencia resuelve el recurso de casación interpuesto por la entidad mercantil Unión Fenosa Generación, S.A., contra la Sentencia de la Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo del Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Asturias de 29 de julio de 2008, desestimatoria del recurso contencioso-administrativo promovido por dicha entidad mercantil contra la Resolución de la Confederación Hidrográfica del Norte de 5 de abril de 2005, dictada en el marco de un expediente de transferencia del aprovechamiento hidroeléctrico de 28.000 litros/segundo de agua del río Límia, en los términos municipales de Bande, Lobera, Lovios y Muiños (Orense), salto de Las Conchas, en cuanto impone a la recurrente la obligación de que presente, en un plazo de tres meses, un proyecto de dispositivo de paso con las dimensiones
Sentencia del Tribunal Superior de Justicia de la Comunidad Valenciana de 22 de marzo de 2011 (Sala de lo Contencioso Administrativo, Sección 1ª, Ponente: Edilberto José Narbón Lainez)
Autora: Celia Gonzalo Miguel. Personal Investigador en Formación del CIEDA-CIEMAT.
Fuente: ROJ STSJ CV 1403/2011
Temas Clave: Energía eólica; Lugares de importancia comunitaria (LIC); Zona de especial protección para las aves (ZEPA); Instrumentos de planificación; Important Bird Area (IBA).
Resumen:
La presente Sentencia examina el recurso contencioso administrativo interpuesto contra la Orden de 6.03.2008 de la Consellería de Infraestructuras y Transportes de la Generalidad Valenciana por la que se realiza nueva convocatoria pública para el desarrollo y ejecución del Plan Eólico de la Comunidad Valenciana, por ACCIÓN ECOLOGISTA AGRO y ASOCIACIÓN PARA UN DESARROLLO EÓLICO SOSTENIBLE.
Antes de entrar en el análisis de fondo de la Sentencia, conviene detenerse en la cuestión previa de carácter procesal analizada en el Fundamento de Derecho Cuarto, relativa a la naturaleza jurídica del Plan Eólico de la Comunidad Valenciana, y ello porque el demandante con motivo de la impugnación de la Orden, impugna de manera indirecta el Plan Eólico de la
Sentencia del Tribunal Superior de Justicia del País Vasco 388/2011, de 6 de junio (Sala de lo Contencioso, Sede Bilbao, Sección 1ª. Ponente D. Juan Alberto Fernández Fernández)
Autora: Ana Mª Barrena Medina. Personal Investigador en Formación, CIEDA-CIEMAT
Fuente: ROJ STSJ PAV 2117/2011
Temas Clave: Costas
Resumen:
Constituye el objeto de la presente sentencia el recurso interpuesto contra la sentencia dictada el ocho de julio de dos mil diez por el Juzgado de lo Contencioso Administrativo número uno de Donostia que desestimó el recurso presentado contra la Resolución del Director general de la Agencia Vasca del Agua de septiembre de 2009 por el que se imponía a la ahora recurrente la multa de sesenta mil euros y la obligación de reponer a su estado anterior la zona de servidumbre de protección del dominio público marítimo terrestre. El recurso se funda en siete motivos, que serán analizados por la Sala, como consecuencia de la realización de actividades extractivas, para la explotación de una cantera, en la zona de la servidumbre de protección sin la preceptiva autorización otorgada de conformidad con lo dispuesto por los artículos 25 y 26 de
Sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea (Sala Primera), de 21 de julio de 2011, asunto C-2/10, que tiene por objeto la resolución de una cuestión prejudicial planteada por el Tribunal Administrativo regional de la Región de Puglia (Italia), en el procedimiento entre Azienda Agro-Zootecnica Franchini y Eolica di Altamura, de una parte, y la Región de Puglia de otra
Autor: Ángel Ruiz de Apodaca Espinosa, Profesor Titular de Derecho Administrativo, Universidad de Navarra
Fuente: http://curia.europa.eu
Temas clave: Espacios naturales protegidos, energías renovables, energía eólica, normas adicionales de protección establecidas por los estados miembros, prohibición de instalación de aerogeneradores salvo autoconsumo, impacto ambiental.
Resumen:
Breve referencia al supuesto de hecho:
La petición de decisión prejudicial tiene por objeto la interpretación de la Directiva 2009/28/CE, relativa al fomento del uso de energía procedente de fuentes renovables, de la Directiva 92/43/CEE, relativa a la conservación de los hábitats naturales y de la fauna y flora silvestres, así como de la Directiva 79/409/CEE del Consejo, relativa a la conservación de las aves silvestres.
El proceso del que trae causa la cuestión prejudicial tiene por objeto la
Para ofrecer las mejores experiencias, utilizamos tecnologías como las cookies para almacenar y/o acceder a la información del dispositivo. El consentimiento de estas tecnologías nos permitirá procesar datos como el comportamiento de navegación o las identificaciones únicas en este sitio. No consentir o retirar el consentimiento, puede afectar negativamente a ciertas características y funciones.
Funcional
Siempre activo
El almacenamiento o acceso técnico es estrictamente necesario para el propósito legítimo de permitir el uso de un servicio específico explícitamente solicitado por el abonado o usuario, o con el único propósito de llevar a cabo la transmisión de una comunicación a través de una red de comunicaciones electrónicas.
Preferencias
El almacenamiento o acceso técnico es necesario para la finalidad legítima de almacenar preferencias no solicitadas por el abonado o usuario.
Estadísticas
El almacenamiento o acceso técnico que es utilizado exclusivamente con fines estadísticos.El almacenamiento o acceso técnico que se utiliza exclusivamente con fines estadísticos anónimos. Sin un requerimiento, el cumplimiento voluntario por parte de tu proveedor de servicios de Internet, o los registros adicionales de un tercero, la información almacenada o recuperada sólo para este propósito no se puede utilizar para identificarte.
Marketing
El almacenamiento o acceso técnico es necesario para crear perfiles de usuario para enviar publicidad, o para rastrear al usuario en una web o en varias web con fines de marketing similares.
