Sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia (Sala Quinta) de 7 de abril de 2016, asunto C-556/14, que resuelve recurso de casación interpuesto por Holcim SA contra la Sentencia del Tribunal General de 18 de septiembre de 2014 (Holcim/Comisión Europea) que desestimó el recurso de responsabilidad extracontractual de la Unión por la negativa de la Comisión a revelar información y prohibir transacciones sobre derechos de emisión robados
Autora: Inmaculada Revuelta Pérez, Profesora Titular de Derecho Administrativo, Universitat de València
Fuente: Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea, Asunto C-556/14 P, ECLI:EU:C:2016:207
Temas Clave: Responsabilidad extracontractual de la UE; Derechos de emisión de gases de efecto invernadero; Sistema normalizado de registros nacionales; Potestades de la Comisión; Deber de confidencialidad; Secreto comercial
Resumen:
El TJUE desestima el recurso de casación interpuesto por Holcim (Rumania) SA contra la Sentencia del Tribunal General de 18 de septiembre de 2014 (T-317/12) que rechazó su pretensión de indemnización por los daños y perjuicios derivados de la negativa de la Comisión Europea a revelar, alegando razones de confidencialidad, la localización de derechos de emisión robados de sus cuentas por ciberdelincuentes así como a “bloquearlos”, impidiéndole recuperarlos. La Sentencia rechaza las alegaciones de la empresa confirmando todas las razones esgrimidas por el Tribunal General para no reconocerle derechos indemnizatorios.
La empresa fundamentó la responsabilidad alegando, en primer lugar, el comportamiento ilegal de la Comisión Europea, al negarse a divulgar o permitir la divulgación de la localización de los derechos de emisión sustraídos, por ser contrario a la Directiva 2003/87 y al Reglamento 2216/2004, que regulan el régimen de derechos de emisión y el sistema de registros asociados y vulnerar el principio de proporcionalidad, de confianza legítima, del deber de asistencia y protección; y, el derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva, en relación con el derecho de propiedad; en segundo lugar, la aplicación ilícita de los arts. 19 y 20 de la Directiva 2003/87, así como del Reglamento nº 2216/2004 de la Comisión Europea (art. 10), por lo que respecta a la seguridad, confidencialidad y funcionamiento del sistema de derechos de emisión; y, en tercer lugar, la afección de un acto lícito a un determinado círculo de operadores económicos de manera desproporcionada en comparación con otros (perjuicio anormal) y que sobrepasan los límites del riesgo económico inherente a las operaciones en el sector de que se trata (daño especial).
La Sentencia confirma, en particular, que la normativa aplicable (Directiva 2003/87; y, Reglamento 2216/2004) garantiza la confidencialidad de los datos sobre haberes y transacciones de los derechos de emisión por lo que las excepciones previstas a esta regla general deben interpretarse restrictivamente y que, por tanto, la Comisión no vulneró la debida ponderación entre confidencialidad y transparencia establecida en las mismas, en la medida en que sólo podía suministrar esa información a las autoridades contempladas en el art. 10 del citado Reglamento (cuerpos y fuerzas de seguridad de los Estados; autoridades fiscales de los Estados, Oficina Europea de Lucha contra el Fraude, Europol y a los administradores de registro de los Estados), pero no podía suministrarla directamente a una «sociedad comercial»; y, que la OLAF había remitido información sobre los derechos sustraídos. La Sentencia confirma la inaplicación a los derechos de emisión del régimen de publicidad establecido en el Protocolo de Kioto, ya que las “unidades” previstas en el mismo tienen naturaleza y objetivos diferentes; o, que la normativa aplicable no permite a la Comisión bloquear los derechos de emisión en este supuesto de robo. El Tribunal de Justicia, en suma, ratifica que el comportamiento de la Comisión fue ajustado a Derecho.
Destacamos los siguientes extractos:
“48 In the light of those considerations, it must be found, first, that the General Court did not err in law in holding, in paragraphs 106 and 107 of the judgment under appeal, that Article 10 of Regulation No 2216/2004 established, as a general rule, that the data held in the registries was confidential and that, therefore, the exceptions to that general rule had to be interpreted strictly.
49 Secondly, it must be pointed out that the arguments set out in paragraphs 38 and 39 of the present judgment are based on a misinterpretation of the judgment under appeal.
50 Consequently, in stating in paragraph 107 of the judgment under appeal that the exception to the confidential treatment of the data contained in the registries benefits ‘as a rule, only authorities exercising public powers’, the General Court did not in any way adopt an excessively restrictive interpretation of Article 10 of Regulation No 2216/2004. It simply pointed out that the entities listed in Article 10(2) of that regulation, that is those which may obtain the data at issue, are public persons, equipped, as such, with powers falling outside the scope of the general law.
51 Similarly, the General Court did not restrict the possibility of benefiting from the disclosure of the information in the registries solely to law enforcement authorities. The General Court simply held, in paragraph 122 of the judgment under appeal, that the President of the Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles, as a judge hearing an application for interim measures, could not be considered ‘a law enforcement authority’ within the meaning of Article 10(2)(a), inasmuch as he was not responsible for any investigation concerning the emission allowances. In addition, the General Court did not in any way justify the non-disclosure of the information at issue to that authority on the basis of the latter’s specialisation. It follows from those considerations that the judgment under appeal is not vitiated by any contradictory reasoning.
52 In any event, it must be found that the General Court took into account, contrary to Holcim’s claims, the interest of the holders of the stolen emission allowances.
53 First, in paragraph 154 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held that a victim of an alleged criminal offence, such as the theft of emission allowances, may obtain the disclosure of data relating to those allowances held in the registries and the Community independent transaction log, pursuant to Article 10 of Regulation No 2216/2004. It stated that Article 10 did not preclude the authorities listed in Article 10(2) from disclosing to those victims the confidential information concerning the stolen emission allowances, nor those victims, on the basis of the information disclosed to them, from bringing judicial proceedings for the seizure and recovery of those allowances.
54 Secondly, in paragraph 121 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court found, without being contradicted by the appellant, that, in response to the request of the Romanian public prosecutor, OLAF had sent that national authority a series of data concerning the stolen allowances. In the light of the sending of that data, the General Court held that the appellant could not validly claim that the Commission had refused to disclose information to the Romanian public prosecutor on the basis of its confidentiality.
55 In those circumstances, it must be found that the General Court did not err in law in finding that the Commission had not infringed in a sufficiently serious manner the balance between confidentiality and transparency laid down in Article 10 of Regulation No 2216/2004 and that, consequently, the General Court did not disregard Article 19 of Directive 2003/87”.
“66 Holcim’s arguments have not therefore showed the existence of an error of law by the General Court when it held that emission allowances and Kyoto units are different in nature and address different aims. Consequently, the publicity regime established by the Annex to Decision 13. CMP/1 as regards the Kyoto units cannot be applied to emission allowances, even if such a measure were to form part of the EU legal order.
67 In addition, it must be held that in not applying to emission allowances the rules provided for in the Annex to Decision 13/CMP.1 concerning the Kyoto units, the General Court did not fail to have regard to the principle of legal certainty, given the different nature of those two instruments”.
“80 It must be noted, first of all, that, in accordance with the principle of sound administration, the EU institutions must examine all the relevant particulars of a case with care and impartiality and gather all the factual and legal information necessary to exercise their discretion (see, to that effect, judgment inBrookfield New Zealand and Elaris v CPVO and Schniga, C 534/10 P, EU:C:2012:813, paragraph 51).
81 In this instance, Holcim’s complaints summarised in paragraphs 74 and 76 above are based on the incorrect premiss that the Commission was empowered to block the appellant’s allowances in circumstances such as those of the present case. However, as the General Court was fully entitled to hold, in paragraphs 201 and 205 of the judgment under appeal, neither Article 27 nor Article 69 of Regulation No 2216/2004 allowed, in the present case, the Commission to block the stolen emission allowances. In particular, Article 69 only allows all access to be suspended to a registry in the event of systemic risk. Holcim does not, however, rely on any other provision of Regulation No 2216/2004 or Directive 2003/87 which would allow the Commission to block the stolen allowances.
82 Since there is no provision allowing the Commission to block the appellant’s allowances in circumstances such as those of the present case, it must be found, first, that the General Court did not err in holding that the Commission had not failed to have regard to the principle of sound administration and, secondly, that the General Court did not fail to have regard to the principle of legal certainty.
83 It must be found, next, that the complaints summarised in paragraphs 75 and 77 above are inadmissible. By its complaints, Holcim seeks, in essence, to have the Court of Justice substitute its own assessment of the facts and evidence for that carried out by the General Court in the judgment under appeal.
84 Lastly, it must be found that, in paragraph 209 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court provided a sufficient explanation of the reasons why the Commission could only carry out a generalised suspension of all access to the registries in the event of systemic risk. Consequently, the judgment under appeal is not vitiated by a failure to state the grounds.
85 In the light of all of the foregoing considerations, the eighth and ninth grounds of appeal must be rejected”.
“105 A plea alleging that liability is incurred for a lawful act of the European Union must be rejected, and the Court does not need to adjudicate on the possibility of liability being incurred on the part of the European Union for such acts, inasmuch as the material and non-material damage alleged by the appellant are not unusual or special (see, to that effect, judgments in Développement et Clemessy v Commission, 267/82, EU:C:1986:253, paragraph 33, and Sviluppo Italia Basilicata v Commission, C‑414/08 P, EU:C:2010:165, paragraph 141).
106 In the present case, it must be found that Holcim simply alleges a failure to state the grounds in the judgment under appeal as regards the unusual nature of the damage which it has sustained. In the appellant’s view, the General Court has not stated the grounds, in paragraph 237 of the judgment under appeal, for its statements that, first, business confidentiality could not be guaranteed without the application of confidentiality rules such as those laid down in Article 10 of Regulation No 2216/2004 and, secondly, the absence of such a provision would compromise the existence of an emission allowances market.
107 It must be found that the General Court, in particular in the analysis carried out in the first and third pleas in law of the judgment under appeal, explained to the requisite legal standard the reasons underlying the adoption of the scheme established by Article 10 of Regulation No 2216/2004”.
Comentario de la Autora:
Este pronunciamiento pone de manifiesto que la confidencialidad y la tutela del secreto comercial constituye un interés público especialmente protegido en el mercado de derechos de emisión de gases con efecto invernadero de la Unión Europea, de tal forma que la Comisión está muy limitada en cuanto al suministro de información sobre haberes y transacciones comerciales de los mismos y sólo puede difundirla a determinadas autoridades públicas y no (directamente) a empresas privadas, aunque hayan sido víctimas de un robo de derechos. Dicha información podrán obtenerla a través de dichas autoridades y no de la Comisión.
Según la jurisprudencia comunitaria los perjuicios derivados de la sustracción de derechos de emisión de las cuentas de las empresas que participan en el comercio de emisiones forman parte del riesgo inherente a los sectores afectados, en la medida en que el mismo se lleva a cabo a través de un sistema informático abierto en Internet que presenta riesgos técnicos notables.
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