Sentencia del TEDH de 21 de julio de 2011, núm. 38182/03, Grimkovskaya c. Ucrania
Autor: Enrique J. Martínez Pérez, profesor contratado doctor de la Universidad de Valladolid
Palabras clave: contaminación acústica, participación pública, derecho al respeto a la vida privada y familiar
Resumen:
La sentencia que ahora exponemos resuelve una demanda presentada contra Ucrania por la contaminación derivada del intenso tráfico de una carretera. En 1998 las autoridades ucranianas modificaron el trazado de la autopista M04, desviándolo por una calle ubicada en una zona residencial en la ciudad de Krasnodon, donde vivía la demandante (Natalya Grimkovskaya) con sus padres y su hijo menor. Desde entonces su casa se convirtió prácticamente inhabitable; sufrieron vibraciones, polución y ruido constantes por la circulación de vehículos. Además, los numerosos baches que aparecieron posteriormente, originados por las malas condiciones del pavimento, fueros asfaltados con materiales muy baratos, tales como residuos de una mina de carbón cercana con un alto contenido en metales pesados. Ante las quejas de los vecinos, las autoridades sanitarias midieron los niveles de contaminación en la zona, llegando a la conclusión de que el contenido en polvo de cobre y plomo era respectivamente 23 y 7,5 veces superiores a lo permitido en las normas de seguridad aplicables. Tanto la madre como el hijo presentaron diferentes certificados médicos en los cuales se indicaba que padecía graves enfermedades, entre otras, bronquitis crónica e insuficiencia respiratoria. El hospital infantil de la localidad llegó incluso a recomendar el cambio de domicilio al hijo de la demandante al comprobar que éste había vivido en un zona extremadamente contaminada ambientalmente desde su nacimiento.
La demandante interpuso una demanda civil en la que solicitaba a las autoridades municipales una nueva ubicación para su familia y una compensación pecuniaria por los daños causados a su casa y a su salud, que fue finalmente rechazada después de varios recursos. Paralelamente, se instó al fiscal la apertura del procedimiento penal; solicitud que tampoco fue atendida porque se estimó que no había base para vincular la situación denunciada y la conducta de las autoridades competentes. En junio de 2002 la calle fue cerrada al tráfico. Los responsables estatales, aunque reconocieron la urgente necesidad de construir circunvalaciones alrededor de las zonas pobladas, alegaron que no había recursos económicos para ello. En noviembre de 2010 se produjo la reapertura de la carretera sin efectuar las reparaciones precisas.
La reclamante alega la violación del artículo 8 del Convenio de Roma, que dice que “toda persona tiene derecho al respeto de su vida privada y familiar, de su domicilio y de su correspondencia”. Para que dicha reclamación prospere, se deberá demostrar, como reiteradamente viene exigiendo el Tribunal en su jurisprudencia, que el perjuicio causado alcanza un nivel mínimo de gravedad, lo que dependerá de las circunstancias concretas de cada caso, siendo para ello relevantes, entre otros datos, la intensidad y la duración del perjuicio, así como los efectos físicos y mentales. En este caso, el Tribunal considera que el nivel de ruido y sus efectos no han sido nunca evaluados. Así pues, resulta imposible determinar hasta qué punto la enfermedad que padecen ha sido causada o agravada por el tráfico de la carretera. Sin embargo, considera que los efectos acumulativos del ruido, vibración y contaminación del suelo y aire han perturbado negativamente la vida familiar de la demandante.
La Corte apunta además que la gestión de las infraestructuras es una tarea complicada que exige un coste económico importante. Aunque los Estados han asumido una mayor responsabilidad a la hora de controlar la contaminación, no puede exigirse a cada Estado que asegure a cada individuo el disfrute de su vivienda de acuerdo con las normas ambientales particulares. Ahora bien, consideran que no se ha establecido un justo equilibrio entre los intereses de los demandantes y los intereses de la comunidad en su conjunto, porque no se han respetado determinas exigencias de naturaleza procedimental: no se ha llevado a cabo un estudio adecuado sobre la viabilidad ambiental del proyecto; no se ha permitido a los afectados contestar judicialmente a la actuación estatal; pero, sobre todo, se ha negado la participación del demandante en el correspondiente proceso de toma de decisiones medioambientales. Consecuentemente se ha producido una violación del artículo 8 del Convenio.
Destacamos los siguientes extractos:
58. Referring to its well-established case-law (see, among other authorities, López Ostra v. Spain, 9 December 1994, Series A no. 303-C; Dubetska and Others v. Ukraine, no. 30499/03, §§ 105-108, 10 February 2011) the Court reiterates that, where, as in the present case, the case concerns an environmental hazard, an arguable claim under Article 8 may arise only where the hazard at issue attains a level of severity resulting in significant impairment of the applicant’s ability to enjoy her home, private or family life. The assessment of that minimum level is relative and depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the intensity and duration of the nuisance and its physical or mental effects on the individual’s health or quality of life.
59. In line with these principles, the Court must first consider whether the detriment suffered by the applicant on account of the operation of the M04 motorway starting from October 1998 was sufficiently serious to raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention. The Court observes that the applicant’s complaints concern, primarily, the level of noise, damage to her house from vibration and her sufferings on account of the deterioration of her parents’ and her minor son’s health resulting from air and soil pollution.
60. The Court considers that there is insufficient evidence to prove all the applicant’s allegations ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. In particular, the noise levels and their impact on the applicant’s private and family life have never been measured (see a contrario Deés v. Hungary, no. 2345/06, § 23, 9 November 2010). The allegation that the damage to the house had been caused by vibration was disputed by the Government with reference to a competent authority’s opinion and has never been confirmed by an independent expert. Insofar as the applicant’s parents’ health can fall within the scope of her family life under Article 8, the case file contains medical evidence that they suffer from numerous illnesses. However, based on this evidence, it is not possible to determine to what extent these illnesses have been caused or aggravated by the operation of the motorway. As regards the health of the applicant’s minor son, it appears that he already suffered from immunodeficiency before October 1998 and that in his doctors’ opinion he had resided in an ‘environmentally saturated area’ from his birth in 1994 (see paragraph 17 above).
61. At the same time, the Court notes that according to the official investigation of 15 May 2002 (see paragraph 12 above), the surface of the road near the applicant’s house was severely damaged and more than one hundred vehicles drove over it during one hour. It is not implausible in these circumstances that the applicant was regularly disturbed by noise and vibration, at least to some extent. Further, more than half of the examined vehicles were found to be emitting pollutants in excess of applicable safety standards. The level of air and soil pollution was assessed by the domestic environmental health authorities as necessitating the suspension of the use of the road, on pain of risk of adverse impact on the residents’ health (see paragraph 19 above). The polluting substances emitted by the vehicles included copper and lead, an excessive level of which was also found in the soil near the applicant’s house. In light of these findings, the Court considers it particularly notable that the applicant’s son was diagnosed in 2002 with chronic lead and copper salts poisoning. The Court notes that the Government have not provided any evidence disproving the authenticity and accuracy of this diagnosis and have not proposed any plausible alternative explanation concerning the origin of this poisoning to counter the applicant’s allegation that it was directly connected to the motorway’s operation.
62. Regard being had to the above data, the Court considers that the cumulative effect of noise, vibration and air and soil pollution generated by the M04 motorway significantly deterred the applicant from enjoying her rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. Article 8 is therefore applicable in the present case.
63. In view of the above, the Court will next examine, in the light of the principles developed in its jurisprudence (see, among other authorities, Dubetska, cited above, §§ 140-145) whether the Government have provided sufficient evidence to justify a situation in which the applicant bore a heavy burden on behalf of the rest of the community.
64. The Court firstly notes that, as submitted by the Government, on 16 June 2002, within one month of the investigation by the environmental health authorities, K. Street was closed off to through traffic. Lacking concrete data, and, in particular, texts of relevant domestic decisions (if any) in evidence of the applicant’s allegations that this decision was in fact enforced at an unspecified later date or that the traffic was eventually restarted, the Court will proceed from the assumption that through traffic was stopped on the date suggested by the Government (see, mutatis mutandis, Vinokurov v. Russia and Ukraine (dec.), no. 2937/04, 16 October 2007). Consequently, it must be noted that the issues of noise, vibration, air and soil pollution connected to its functioning were redressed. It, however, remains to be examined whether the State authorities should still be liable for the adverse effects of the motorway’s operation between October 1998 and June 2002.
65. In assessing this matter, the Court recognises the complexity of the State’s tasks in handling infrastructural issues, such as the present one, where measures requiring considerable time and resources may be necessary. Being mindful of its subsidiary role under the Convention, on many occasions the Court has emphasized that the States should enjoy a considerable margin of appreciation in the complex sphere of environmental policymaking (see, for example, Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 36022/97, § 100, ECHR 2003-VIII). While the authorities of the Member States are increasingly taking on responsibility for minimising or controlling pollution, Article 8 cannot be construed as requiring them to ensure that every individual enjoys housing that meets particular environmental standards (see Ward v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 31888/03, 9 November 2004). In line with these considerations, the Court considers that it would be going too far to render the Government responsible for the very fact of allowing cross-town through traffic to pass through a populated street or establish the applicant’s general right to free, new housing at the State’s expense. All the more so, given that the applicant in the present case has not argued that her house has decreased in value since October 1998 or that she has otherwise been unable to sell it and relocate without the State’s support (see, a contrario, Fadeyeva v. Russia, no. 55723/00, § 121, ECHR 2005-IV).
66. While the Court finds no reason to reassess the substance of the Government’s decision to allow the use of K. Street as a through road, in examining the procedural aspect of relevant policymaking, the Court is not convinced that minimal safeguards to ensure a fair balance between the applicant’s and the community’s interests were put in place.
67. It notes, firstly, that the Government have not shown that the 1998 decision to route motorway M04 via K. Street was preceded by an adequate feasibility study, assessing the probability of compliance with applicable environmental standards and enabling interested parties, including K. Street’s residents, to contribute their views (see, a contrario, Hatton, cited above, § 128). On the contrary, the nature of this decision and the adequacy of attenuating procedures appear quite ambiguous, particularly in light of the Government’s disagreement with the applicant as to whether the 1998 decision re-routed the traffic from P. Street to K. Street or merely confirmed K. Street’s earlier status as a through road. The Court considers, however, that even if K. Street had been used by through traffic before the 1998 stocktaking project, the State authorities were responsible for ensuring minimal procedural safeguards in this project’s course. Neither the domestic court decisions, nor the Government’s observations contain evidence that these safeguards, and particularly public access to relevant environmental information and decision-taking in the period of contemplating the stocktaking project, existed.
68. Secondly, the Court considers that no later than the time of the 1998 stocktaking project, the authorities likewise became responsible for putting in place a reasonable policy for mitigating the motorway’s harmful effects on the Article 8 rights of K. Street’s residents (see, mutatis mutandis, Fadeyeva, cited above, §§ 127-131). It appears that the municipal authorities did take some measures aimed at the street’s environmental management (see paragraph 30 above). However, neither the assessment made by domestic courts in their judgments, nor the Government’s observations contain sufficient detail enabling the Court to conclude that this management was effective and meaningful before the measurement of critical pollution levels on 15 May 2002. As transpires from the available materials, this measurement session was carried out only in response to repeated complaints by K. Street’s residents, which, according to the case file, were initially lodged no later than in 2000.
69. Thirdly, emphasising the importance of public participation in environmental decision-making as a procedural safeguard for ensuring rights protected by Article 8 of the Convention, the Court underlines that an essential element of this safeguard is an individual’s ability to challenge an official act or omission affecting her rights in this sphere before an independent authority (see Dubetska, cited above, § 143). It also notes that as of 30 October 2001 the Aarhus Convention, which concerns access to information, participation of the public in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters has entered into force in respect of Ukraine (see paragraph 39 above). In the meantime, it has not been shown in the present case that the applicant was afforded a meaningful opportunity to contest the State authorities’ policymaking regarding the M04 motorway during the period of October 1998 – June 2002 before the domestic courts.
70. The Court notes that the applicant formally attempted to do so by lodging through Mrs Grishchenko a civil claim against the Executive Committee. As appears from the brief reasoning adduced by the Lugansk Regional Court of Appeal for dismissing her claim (see paragraph 33 above), its analysis was mostly limited to concluding that the defendant was not at all responsible for K. Street’s maintenance and repair. The Court notes that a variety of documents in the case file appear to pinpoint that such responsibility did – at least to some extent – in fact exist (see paragraphs 24-26, 30 and 34 above), while the court’s reasoning does not contain any reference to the evidence which served as a basis for its contrary conclusion.
71. Regardless, however, of which authority was responsible for the maintenance of K. Street’s road surface and other amenities, the Court finds it more important that the courts’ reasoning does not contain a direct response to the applicant’s main arguments, on the basis of which she had sought to establish the Executive Committee’s liability. In particular, while the first-instance court questioned some witnesses as to some points of the municipality’s environmental policy, neither its, nor the higher courts’ judgments contain any express assessment as to why they considered that this policy adequately protected the applicant’s rights. Likewise, no reasoning was provided for dismissing an allegation that the defendant’s decision taken in October 1998 was in and of itself unlawful and arbitrary, and it is unclear from the case file whether this aspect of the applicant’s complaint was at all studied during the proceedings at issue. The Court considers that the applicant’s arguments concerning the unlawfulness and arbitrariness of the above decision and the adequacy of the municipality’s environmental policy concerning K. Street were of paramount importance for resolving whether or not the defendant’s conduct struck a fair balance between the applicant’s rights guaranteed by Article 8 and the interests of the community. Lacking reasoning for the dismissal of these arguments in the texts of the domestic judgments, the Court is unable to conclude that the applicant had a meaningful opportunity to adduce her viewpoints before an independent authority.
72. Overall, the Court attaches importance to the following factors. First, the Government’s failure to show that the decision to designate K. Street as part of the M04 motorway was preceded by an adequate environmental feasibility study and followed by the enactment of a reasonable environmental management policy. Second, the Government did not show that the applicant had a meaningful opportunity to contribute to the related decision-making processes, including by challenging the municipal policies before an independent authority. Bearing those two factors and the Aarhus Convention (see paragraph 39) in mind, the Court cannot conclude that a fair balance was struck in the present case.
Comentario del autor:
Antes de nada hay que recordar que el Tribunal ha afirmado que, aunque el Convenio no reconoce expresamente el derecho a un ambiente sano (STEDH, as. Kyrtatos c. Grecia, de 22 de mayo de 2003), la contaminación de todo tipo, si alcanza un umbral mínimo de severidad, puede dar lugar a la violación del Convenio. Ello se debe, según reiterada jurisprudencia, a que la vulneración del derecho de respeto al domicilio enunciado en el artículo 8 del Convenio puede derivar no sólo de injerencias de índole material o corporal, sino también de las agresiones inmateriales o incorpóreas, como ruidos, emisiones u olores (STEDH, as. Moreno Gómez c. España, de 16 de noviembre de 2004). Ahora bien, hay que dejar al margen los peligros posibles o hipotéticos, por lo que es preciso presentar una evaluación de los daños amparada en datos científicos.
En cualquier caso, las autoridades estatales pueden ser consideradas responsables no sólo por una injerencia de los poderes públicos, sino también por sus omisiones (obligaciones positivas), entre otras, la no adopción de medidas tendentes a asegurar el respeto de la vida privada. En este asunto vemos que lo que no se ha respetado son una serie de obligaciones de naturaleza procedimental, muy arraigas en el Derecho comunitario y en el Derecho internacional, como son el derecho de acceso al público a la información ambiental, el derecho de participación del público en el proceso de toma de decisiones y el derecho de acceso a la justicia, todas ellas desarrolladas en el Convenio de Aarhus de 1998: un instrumento jurídico internacional que, como en otras ocasiones (STEDH, as. Taskin y otros c. Turquía, de 4 de diciembre de 2003), ha servido, con independencia de su ratificación por parte del Estado demandado, para interpretar las disposiciones del Convenio.
